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The Longer-Term Effects of 
Management-Led Buy-Outs
Mike Wright 
Nick Wilson 
Ken Robbie
There is now extensive evidence on short-term performance improvements in buy-outs, 
but little relating to the longer-term. This paper examines the relatively neglected area 
of the longevity and longer-term effects of smaller buy-outs. In terms of longevity, the 
evidence presented shows that the majority remain as independent buy-outs for at least 
eight years after the transaction, and that entrepreneurial actions concerning both 
restructuring and product innovation are important parts of entrepreneurs’ strategies 
over a ten year period or more. For the first time, the paper also provides an analysis of 
the financial performance and productivity of a large sample of buy-outs and non-buy­
outs. It shows that on a variety of financial ratios buy-outs significantly outperform a 
matched sample of non-buy-outs, especially from year 3 onwards. Analysis of post buy­
out efficiency of survivor buy-outs, using regression analysis to estimate augmented 
Cobb-Douglas production functions, shows that buy-outs are superior to matched non­
buy-outs with a productivity differential of the order of 9% on average from year t+2 
onwards. The evidence of superior longer term performance suggests that venture cap­
italists may need to consider their investment perspectives carefully, particularly in 
respect of exit versus second round investment. For financiers it is clear that the buy-out 
concept can be successfully applied to growth as well as restructuring cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Management buy-outs have emerged as a significant organizational form over the 
last decade and a half. It is well-known that the structuring of a buy-out involves 
the introduction of significant equity incentives for the entrepreneurs involved, 
together with monitoring systems by venture capitalists and other funds providers 
(Jensen, 1993; Wright, Robbie, Thompson, & Starkey, 1994). Examination of the 
characteristics of the leading individuals in buy-outs and buy-ins shows that they
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display similar characteristics to those of entrepreneurs generally (Robbie & 
Wright, 1996) and that they undertake significant entrepreneurial actions in terms 
of both restructuring and innovation (Wright,Thompson, & Robbie, 1992; Zahra,
1995).
Buy-outs play a significant role in the activities of venture capitalists, espe­
cially in mature markets (Ooghe, et al., 1991). In the UK, for example, buy-outs 
accounted for 18 percent of the number of investments by the industry in 1994 and 
67 percent of total value (BVCA, 1995). This importance raises issues concerning 
whether the gains which may accrue are sustainable. Dutch analysis shows that 
early stage finance was on average loss-making (-3 percent annual return) com­
pared with the much less riskier management buy-outs which earned a high posi­
tive return of 25 percent per year. Analysis of returns in the UK for a sample of 
funds launched between 1980 and 1990 show that large MBO funds produced the 
highest internal rates of return at 23.1 percent and early stage 4 percent (BVCA,
1996). It is not clear from these studies, however, whether high internal rates of 
return are earned from a series of short-term investments or are the result of long­
term performance.
The expectation of longer term benefits from buy-outs is the subject of some 
debate. Jensen (1993) argues that buy-outs represent a new long term form of orga­
nization whose incentive and monitoring properties may be expected to produce 
superior performance in enterprises having undertaken such a transaction than 
prior to the buy-out. Moreover, benefits may also accrue where entrepreneiurs with 
majority stakes have a longer-term conunitment to the enterprise. However, in 
contrast, it may be the case that the major benefits to be derived from restructuring 
and cost reduction are short-lived and that venture capitahsts seeking to earn high 
internal rates of return on their investments place pressure on management to exit 
in a relatively short period.
The aims of this study are to examine the longevity of venture-backed versus 
non-venture-backed smaller buy-outs, strategic reorganization following buy-out 
and whether buy-outs display superior longer term financial performance and effi­
ciency to non-buy-outs. The particular emphasis is upon smaller management-led 
buy-outs where incumbents typically hold a majority or a significant share of the 
equity. The evidence presented in the results section of this article shows that even 
ten years after the transaction approaching half of companies remain as buy-outs, 
although venture-backed buy-outs exit at a considerably greater rate than non-ven­
ture backed deals. Over this ten year period, buy-outs which remain as such are 
found to experience extensive changes to their senior management teams and to 
engage in extensive strategic entrepreneurial actions (such as new product devel­
opment) as well as cost restructuring. The results of the analysis of longer term 
performance using financial data show that on a variety of financial ratios (such as 
return on assets and return on equity) buy-outs significantly outperform a matched
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sample of non-buy-outs, especially from year 3 onwards. In addition, analysis of 
post buy-out efficiency shows that buy-outs are superior to matched non-buy-outs 
with a productivity differential of the order of 9% on average from the second year 
after buy-out onwards.
The article is structured as follows. The next section reviews existing literature 
and suggests a number of expectations about the longer term performance effects 
of buy-outs. The subsequent section outUnes the data and methodology used and is 
followed by four sections detailing the results of the study. First, we trace the lon­
gevity of venture backed and non-venture backed buy-outs. Second, we identify 
the strategic actions taken in buy-outs which last for ten years or more. Third we 
compare buy-outs and non-buy-outs in terms of their long term financial perfor­
mance. Finally, we examine labor and capital productivity gains. In the final sec­
tion, conclusions and implications are drawn.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Jensen (1993) provides a framework for the analysis of the expected longevity and 
performance effects in buy-outs. According to Jensen, the classic buy-out structure 
with increased managerial equity holding, providing an incentive to perform, and 
increased monitoring through the commitment to service debt and the direct role of 
active investors, provides the mechanisms for reducing agency problems associ­
ated with diffuse ownership in large quoted companies. The Jensen argument sug­
gests that particular types of firms may be especially suited to this classic form of 
buy-out structure, notably those quoted firms in stable and mature markets with 
relatively low investment needs which have been under-performing and wasting 
free cash flow. Such firms may be expected in the Jensen view to continue to oper­
ate as long-term forms of organization. Rappaport (1990) contests the Jensen view 
suggesting that they are likely to be short-lived as investors seek returns on their 
investment by selling or floating the company. It is becoming clear, however, that 
Jensen’s argument rests on a highly restricted sub-set of what is a more generic 
concept. While buy-outs which meet Jensen’s criteria may indeed last a long time, 
the wider applicability of the buy-out concept due to the use of varying financial 
instruments, funding structures and managerial involvement suggests that the lon­
gevity of buy-outs is likely to be heterogeneous (Wright, et al., 1994). While 
extensive evidence is now available relating to larger buy-outs, especially those 
which involve highly leveraged going-privates of listed companies, little is avail­
able on their longer-term effects in terms of strategies, performance, control sys­
tems, etc. Moreover, smaller transactions where management have substantial 
equity stakes and which form the majority of buy-out transactions in most markets 
have received little attention. These cases may be wholly funded by clearing bank 
debt or with a mixture of debt and equity provided by venture capitalists. This
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important role of venture capitalists has tended to be underplayed because of the 
general focus upon highly leveraged transactions and because, especially in the 
US, venture capital firms are not typically associated with buy-outs.
Longevity
Existing evidence suggests that although some buy-outs may float on a stock 
market or be sold within a very short period of time, the majority may remain as 
buy-outs for well in excess of seven years (see e.g., Kaplan, 1991 for the US; 
Wright, Thompson, Robbie, & Wong, 1995 for the UK; Wright, Robbie, Romanet, 
Thompson, Joachimsson, Bruining, & Herst, 1993 for France, Sweden and Hol­
land), with smaller buy-outs being significantly more likely than large ones to 
remain as buy-outs for long periods. This heterogeneity may be expected to be 
influenced by the objectives of the main parties to the transaction-funding institu­
tions (especially venture capitalists and banks and incumbent management 
(Wright, et al., 1994).
Both venture capitalists and clearing banks play a significant role in the fund­
ing of buy-outs (see Table 2 below). Venture capitalists’ and other funding institu­
tions’ perspectives will be important because of their need to earn sufficiently high 
rates of return to satisfy their funds’ providers. There is evidence that investment 
horizons vary between types of venture capitalist (Wright & Robbie, 1996), with 
independent venture capitalists typically being more constrained to exit sooner 
than are those captive firms funded by parent banks or pension funds. Venture cap­
italists’ desires for exit are also more clearly specified than is the case for banks 
where long-term relationships may be important (Holland, 1994).
Hence it is expected that venture-backed buy-outs are more likely to exit 
sooner and at a greater rate than non-venture backed buy-outs, but also that the 
majority of buy-outs and especially those where management have majority con­
trol will continue to exist as such for long periods. Where exit does not take place 
through flotation or trade sale, financiers may seek to obtain a return through the 
liquidation of at least some of their investment through redemption or repurchase 
by the investee company. Hence, it may be expected that buy-outs which remain 
as independent private (unUsted) firms for long periods will demonstrate extensive 
buying back of preference stock and/or the buy-back of ordinary stock.
The influence of managers may be particularly important where the initiative 
for a buy-out is taken by management who perceive an entrepreneurial opportunity 
(Wright, et al., 1992). The extent to which managers may wish to continue to pur­
sue an entrepreneurial career rather than exiting through becoming managerial 
employees again or through retirement, also impacts on longevity. Differences in 
the motivations of buy-out managers may be an important element in this decision. 
Over a long period of time, it may be expected that retirement and other factors
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will lead to extensive changes in the executive and non-executive board members 
in bought-out companies.
There is evidence that managers engage in extensive changes to control sys­
tems after buy-out as well as organizational restructuring and various efforts to 
enhance their trading activity (Jones, 1992; Wright, et al., 1992). Buy-outs where 
management fail to make adequate restructuring close to buy-out to create a viable 
entity at the time of the buy-out appear more likely to fail. An analysis of financial 
and non-financial variables (Wright, Wilson, Robbie, & Ennew, 1996) shows that 
initial and start-up characteristics of MB Os, reflected in a number of key non- 
fmancial variables demonstrate a strong ability to explain failure up to five years 
later. Greater levels of restructuring undertaken expeditiously at buy-out are asso­
ciated with survival while the need to deal with problems some time after buy-out 
are associated with failure. Factors measuring the initial motivations for manage­
ment undertaking the buy-out relating to desires to control one’s own business, 
develop one’s own talents, long term faith in the company and to achieve financial 
rewards (positive motives) were found to have a significant and negative sign indi­
cating that such motivations reduce the probability of subsequent failure. Buy-outs 
which raise funds from the wider body of employees have a lower probability of 
failure which supports the strength of the incentive-motivation hypothesis over the 
pure risk spreading hypothesis. Liquidity has a significant and negative impact on 
the probability of failure and is consistent with highly leveraged firms facing dif­
ficulty in servicing debt commitments. Small and large buy-outs were also found 
to be more prone to failure with the medium-sized exhibiting a lower failure prob­
ability. High gearing was found to be associated with a higher probability of fail­
ure. Turnover per employee, an activity/efficiency ratio, was negatively associated 
with the profitability of failure. In an agency theory context, these findings are 
consistent with the control function of high levels of debt which place pressure on 
management to restructure. There has, however, been little attention to the strate­
gic actions taken by management over the longer-term in terms of comparisons of 
perceptions of the relative importance of factors at the time of the buy-out and in 
the long-term (in excess of ten years), or of the relative importance of differing 
kinds of external and internal influences on profitability which may be within the 
control of management.
Strategic Reorganization
An examination of large US buy-outs provides evidence of post-buy-out res­
toration of strategic focus, with almost half of buy-outs engaging in significant 
refocusing including divestment of assets (Seth and Easterwood, 1993), although 
it is not clear to what extent these changes occur over the long-or short-term. US 
evidence also generally shows buy-out firms fail to expand their employment in
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line with industry averages and that capital investment falls following the buy-out 
(see Palepu, 1990 and Thompson & Wright, 1995, for reviews). Long and Raven- 
scraft (1993), however, show that those buy-outs which are R&D intensive are not 
disadvantaged. The evidence on UK MBOs is rather different. For the UK, Wright, 
et al. (1992) report that asset sales are offset by new capital investment, particu­
larly in plant and equipment.
Much of the work relating to buy-outs has focused on the benefits from 
restrucmring, with there being a view that such benefits are effectively once-for- 
all. After these cost reductions have been obtained, classic highly leveraged buy­
outs in mature sectors with low investment opportunities may have little prospect 
of further significant performance improvement. However, it is clear that the buy­
out concept is not confined to such tightly restricted circumstances.
In two of the few studies to cover short term changes in smaller buy-outs, Mal­
one (1989) in a US study and Wright and Coyne (1985) and Wright, et.al. (1992) 
for the UK show significant increases in new product development occur post buy­
out which the entrepreneurs concerned consider would not otherwise have hap­
pened. (See also Bull, 1989 for the US). Zahra (1995) shows for a sample of 47 US 
buy-outs where management had contributed a significant share of the purchase 
price, substantial increases in product development, technological alliances, R&D 
staff size and capabilities and new business creation activities. These corporate 
entrepreneurship factors were significantly and positively associated with changes 
in company performance. Little is known, however, about the extent and nature of 
strategic actions in buy-outs which last for periods of ten years or more and in par­
ticular the relative importance attached to product innovation, market-related fac­
tors and cost reductions.
If cost reductions are once-for-all, extensive product and market-related inno­
vation may be expected if the company is to succeed over a long period. Alterna­
tively, long-lasting buy-outs may undertake initial restructuring actions and 
actions to enhance control systems which enables them to maintain a stable posi­
tion over a long period. A priori, it is not clear which case will prevail since both 
may be consistent with the enhanced incentive and control mechanisms found in 
buy-outs. In order to obtain insights on these aspects we surveyed the strategic 
actions of a sample of long lasting buy-outs as well as longer term financial perfor­
mance (see below).
Financial Performance
Most available studies concerning post buy-out financial performance changes 
have concerned the first two to three years after the transaction. Research on US 
LB Os indicates substantial mean improvements in profitability, cash flow and pro­
ductivity measures over the interval between one year prior to the transaction and
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two or three years subsequent to it. A series of studies of early 1980s LBOs (see 
Palepu, 1990; Jensen, 1993; Thompson & Wright, 1995 for reviews) reports mean 
gains in the operating cash flow/sales ratio of between 11.9 and 55% and also 
major increases in productivity. A subsequent study (Opler, 1992) using deals 
completed in the later 1980s reports a 16.5% gain in that ratio over a similar three 
year period. A survey of 182 mid-1980s MBOs in the UK indicated that 6 8 % 
showed clear improvements in profitability, compared with 17% that showed a 
clear profitability fall (Wright, et al., 1992). In this study and the American work 
cited above, improvements in working capital management, particularly credit 
management, and productivity, appear to be an important identified source of 
improved performance.
Performance improvements are reported to be more significant in divisional 
buy-outs which subsequently come to market as opposed to buyouts of firms 
which were previously quoted (Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990; Singh, 1990). 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens show that the gains in performance are mainly the 
result of cost reductions rather than revenue generation or improved asset turnover. 
In contrast, Singh finds that buy-outs coming to market had revenue growth, as 
well as accounts receivable and stock control, above their industry averages. How­
ever, it is possible that such comparisons are biased upwards because only the 
more successful buy-outs are compared to industry averages. In the UK, studies 
have found superior company performance relative to the market in buy-outs 
which come to market both before and after the IPO (Wright & Robbie, 1995).
In an attempt to isolate the factors influencing changes in post buy-out perfor­
mance, Thompson, Wright and Robbie (1992) find using UK data that the size of 
entrepreneurs’ equity stakes is strongly significant, whereas investor control vari­
ables have relatively little influence. Green (1992) reports that over and above any 
(financial) incentive on the buy-out team to become better managers, ownership 
was interpreted as allowing them to perform their tasks more effectively. Owner­
ship was perceived more as an outcome than as a cause of innovative behavior and 
was also associated with owner-managers becoming more careful and critical in 
their analysis of innovative projects. Debt-control was reported to restrict certain 
diversifying and acquisition strategies, at least until leverage was reduced, and to 
encourage cost reduction.
Phan and Hill (1995) in a study of large US going-private buy-outs, show that 
management equity holdings as well as debt are positively associated with 
improved performance post buy-out, but that the former has a greater impact than 
the latter. In one of the few studies to examine performance changes over differing 
periods, they find a positive association between managerial equity and perfor­
mance over one, three and five year periods after buy-out but that this relationship 
in respect of debt and performance does not hold for the longer period.
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Efficiency Changes
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) use a Cobb-Douglas analysis to examine pro­
ductivity changes in buy-outs for a period of eight years prior to the transaction 
and for up to five years afterwards. Using plant level data they find that productiv­
ity is significantly greater for the first three years post buy-out than for any of the 
years pre-buy-out, though buy-out plants were already more efficient than non­
buy-out ones. For years four and five, the differences are not significant, which is 
found to be due to differences in the productivity effects of early and late buy-outs 
rather than the transitory nature of any gains.
Parallel to efficiency studies of buy-outs is a growing body of evidence relat­
ing to wider employee ownership (see e.g. Wilson, 1992 for a review). Conte and 
Svejnar (1987) and Jones and Kato (1995) examine factor productivity using 
Cobb-Douglas production function analysis in US and Japanese firms, respec­
tively, by comparing firms which have extensive employee ownership and those 
where it is absent. Both studies find significant and positive effects on a value 
added measure of productivity from wider share ownership whether it is in the 
form of a co-operative (Conte & Svejnar) or an ESOP (Jones & Kato), although the 
effect declines over time. However, neither of these studies examined cases where 
employee ownership was introduced through a form of buy-out.
Given that buy-outs involve not only direct equity ownership by incumbents 
but also monitoring by active investors and commitments to servicing extemal 
funding, it may be expected that they will display superior financial performance, 
especially profitability and labor and capital productivity than non-buy-outs, after 
controlling for firm and industry characteristics. The remaining sections of this 
paper provide evidence relating to these issues.
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The primary data source for the detailed analysis presented in this article is the 
database of UK buy-outs compiled by the authors. This Centre for Management 
Buy-Out Research (CMBOR) dataset has been compiled on a continuing basis 
since 1980. Data are collected from several sources. The primary source is a twice- 
yearly survey of all known venture capitalists, banks and intermediaries involved 
in the negotiation and completion of buy-out transactions. The respondents receive 
in return a free copy of a definitive quarterly review of the buy-out market, which 
contributes to the survey yielding a near 100 percent response rate. The survey of 
institutions is supplemented by Textline searches of national, local and regional 
press, searches of company accounts and Extel cards for announcements of divest­
ments to management, and searches of the specialist business press. This process 
produces what is effectively a listing of the population of UK buy-outs. The
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Table 1
Development of Buy-outs and Buy-ins in the UK 
(Values and Numbers of Deals)
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Year Values (£m) Numbers
1980-86 4,359 1,580
1987 3,521 434
1988 4,931 489
1989 7,506 523
1990 3,108 597
1991 2,838 567
1992 3,261 586
1993 2,860 485
1994 3,675 548
1995 5,006 542
Source: CMBOR
dataset reveals that the UK buyout market is one of the largest in the world with 
around 500 deals per year completed over the past decade (Table 1).
Two samples were generated from the overall CMBOR database. The first 
involved a representative sample of 158 buyouts completed in 1983-85 and sur­
veyed in mid-1986 and which had been tracked up to end 1995 or receivership. 
This data set was used to monitor in detail the timing and nature of exit from a buy­
out (trade sale/flotation or receivership) for both buy-outs which were venture- 
backed and those which were not. The second sample had considerable overlap 
with the timing of the first and was used to analyze the longer term performance of 
buy-outs. This sample involved 251 buy-outs contained on the CMBOR database 
completed in the period 1982-84, essentially the beginning of the UK buy-out mar­
ket, for which accounting and financial data could be obtained and is used to ana­
lyze the longer term performance and efficiency of buy-outs.
The questionnaire to be administered to the first sample was developed follow­
ing a survey of the literature and discussions with practitioners and was piloted 
with practitioners and a small number of buy-outs. A copy of the full data-capture 
instrument is available on request from the authors. This sample was obtained by 
mailing questionnaires to all buy-outs identified by the authors as having been 
completed in this period. A response rate of 35 percent was achieved to produce 
the 158 companies in the final sample. On the basis of demographic data (source 
of buy-out, geographical region, etc.) chi-squared tests revealed no significant dif­
ferences between the distributions of these variables in the sample and in the buy­
out population generally as kept on the main CMBOR database. The buy-outs in 
this sample which had not exited by mid-1996, were surveyed again ten years after 
the initial survey, using a mail questionnaire developed and piloted as for the pre­
vious one and with a reminder questionnaire also being sent. This survey yielded
3 5  complete responses of buy-outs out of the 71 of the original sample which had 
not exited by the time of the survey in June 1996 (see Tables 3 and 4 plus those 
buy-outs which the authors were able to identify as having exited after ten years). 
This represents a positive response rate of 49.3 percent, which may be considered 
quite high for a mail questionnaire survey and very encouraging indeed for a sam­
ple revisited ten years on. The results from this second survey enabled questions 
relating to longer term strategic factors and changes in management to be exam­
ined.
For the companies in the second sample, accounting data relating to financial 
performance, such as profitability, liquidity, leverage and employee productivity 
were collected. These variables constitute the prime indicators of the main dimen­
sions of the financial performance of a company. In the UK, publicly available 
databases enable such data to be obtained quite readily since companies which are 
not listed on a stock market are required by law to file publicly available accounts. 
The balance sheets and profit and loss accounts were obtained for all years since 
buy-out to 1991 or up to receivership and yielded 251 buy-outs. A matched sample 
of 446 non-buy-outs was also drawn from publicly available databases to enable 
performance comparisons to be made. The data for non-buy-outs were selected on 
the basis of matching criteria relating to size and industry firom a publicly available 
database of privately-held companies (FAME). Drawing on previous studies of the 
financial performance of buy-outs and on standard ratios typically used to assess 
the profitability, labor productivity and liquidity of firms variables were selected 
relating to return on equity, return on assets, profits per employee, two measures of 
short term liquidity (current and quick asset ratios) and a measure of long term 
liquidity ( net worth/total assets). As an alternative to the net worth/total assets 
ratio, the standard gearing ratio was used (borrowings plus preference stock/ 
equity) but this was found to perform less well, being distorted in some years by 
the effects of negative reserves arising from post-tax losses being transferred to 
profit and loss account reserves. A similar problem also arose with the use of the 
income gearing ratio, EBIT/interest, and which was therefore dropped from the 
reported results. The analysis of efficiency presented below utilized added value, 
gross fixed assets and employment as variables measuring output, capital stock 
and labor inputs.
The standard way to test for productivity effects is to estimate a multivariate 
equation which includes a variable controlling for firm type (i.e., buy-out or non­
buy-out) in an appropriately specified production function. The productivity aug­
mentation is hypothesized to be disembodied in the inputs. If we denote real output 
by X, then this will be affected by the levels and quality of capital stock (K), labor 
input (L) and may vary by industry (IND). The inclusion of a dummy variable rep­
resenting the existence or not of a buy-out (MBO) gives an augmented production 
function of the general form:
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X = X(L,K,IND,MBO) (1 )
The productivity effects of the buy-out can be tested via the sign, significance and 
size of the coefficients on the MBO variable. In contrast to univariate ratio analysis 
this approach models productivity in the context of labor and capital inputs and 
controls for industry specific differences in productive efficiency. The buy-out 
dummy tests for broad differences in efficiency that are due to the change in own­
ership. Thus a production function provides a way to describe the relationship 
between inputs and outputs, but is not behavioral. Theory therefore offers us few 
insights into the appropriate specification and functional form. However, mis- 
specification can be a serious issue since the methodology involves relating the 
existence of a buy-out to the residual of output not explained by factor inputs. The 
early literature addressed this problem by testing between a wide variety of alter­
native production function forms, including Cobb-Douglas, Constant Elasticity of 
Substimtion and Translog functions. In general Cobb-Douglas forms tended to 
predominate, though often with both embodied and disembodied varieties of pro­
ductivity enhancement (see Jones & Kato 1995 for a study which investigates the 
productivity impact of ESOPs).
In order to explore this issue regression analysis was used to examine the fol­
lowing relationship between capital stock, total labor input and ou^ut, measured 
as value added, for each year post-buy-out for a period of six years:
(2)
which in log-linear form becomes:
LVA = a + b(UQ + bl (LL) + hi (MBO) + b3....bn (IND) + u (3)
where: LVA is the log of value added, LK is the log of capital resource defined as 
gross fixed assets, LL is the log of employment, MBO is a dummy taking the value 
1 if the enterprise is a buy-out, IND is a set of industry dummies, and u is the error 
term.
In line with expectations noted earlier, management owned a majority of the 
equity in the majority of buy-outs surveyed. In 77.3 percent of cases incumbent 
management held more than half of the equity and in 16 percent of cases they held 
all of it. The buy-outs were overwhelmingly modest in size, with 95 percent having 
a transaction value of £5 million (approx. $10 million) or less. Almost three quar­
ters were divisional buy-outs, a further 1 1  percent involved succession in pri- 
vately-owned firms and the balance were buyouts from receivership or from the 
public sector. There were no going private buy-outs in this period in the UK.
Long-Term Effects of Buy-outs 223
Table 2
Share of UK Management Buy-outs Funded by Venture Capitalists 
Based on Data Relating to All Buy-outs Completed in a Particular
Year 1989-1994
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Size Range
(Transaction Value, £m)
1989
(%)
1990
(%)
1991
(%)
1992
(%)
1993
(%)
1994
(%)
Less than 1 61.3 41.2 38.8 46.2 20.2 40.4
1-5 48.0 38.8 40.6 32.0 28.9 35.5
5-10 74.4 75.6 56.0 59.1 88.9 83.9
Over 10 84.2 11.\ 77.8 93.3 85.4 87.5
Source: CMBOR
IV. RESULTS 
Longevity
The authors’ monitoring through the CMBOR database shows that venture 
capitalists play an important role in buy-out markets (Table 2). However, not all 
buy-outs are funded with the aid of venture capitalists. Rather, many, especially 
smaller ones, are funded by straightforward bank debt. As seen in the earlier liter­
ature review, this raises issues concerning the relative longevity of buy-outs 
funded from these two sources. The first sample of 158 buy-outs identified in the 
previous section are used in this section to compare the longevity of venture 
backed and non-venture backed buy-outs. The authors’ monitoring of buy-out 
exits shows marked differences in the longevity of the buy-outs financed from 
these different sources. The overall sample of buy-outs completed in 1983-85 as 
described in the methodology section were divided into 1 1 1  which had originally 
received venture backing (Table 3) and 45 which had not, being primarily funded 
by bank debt (Table 4).
In line with expectations, venture backed buy-outs tend to exit sooner and to a 
greater extent than those which have not received support from venture capitalists. 
After three years, 18 percent of venture-backed cases had exited by trade sale or 
IPO compared with only 2 percent of other buy-outs. By year five after buy-out, 
the comparable figures were 30.6 percent and 13.3 percent, respectively. There are 
indications that those venture backed deals which will fail do so sooner than is the 
case for non-venture backed cases, but that the latter’s failure rate overtakes that of 
the former by year 8 . By year 10 after buy-out, 46 percent of venture backed buy­
outs had exited through trade sale or IPO and a further tenth had entered receiver­
ship. In contrast, only a tenth of non-venture backed deals had exited by trade sale 
or IPO and almost a sixth had failed.
There appears to be a significant minority of buy-out entrepreneurs who see 
their firms as becoming privately-held businesses for an indefinite period of time.
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Table 3
Cumulative Exit Status By Year Post-Buy-out and Type of Exit of 111 
Venture-Backed Management Buy-outs Completed in the Period 1983-85
up to December 1995
Total sample No exit Exit^ Receivership
AgeofMBO No % No % No % No %
Year 1 111 100.0 110 99.1 1 0.9 0 0
Year 2 111 100.0 103 92.8 7 7.2 0 0
Year 3 111 100.0 90 81.1 20 18.0 1 0.9
Year 4 111 100.0 83 74.8 27 24.3 2 1.8
Years 111 100.0 72 64.9 34 30.6 5 4.5
Year 6 111 100.0 62 55.9 41 36.9 8 7.2
Year? 111 100.0 57 51.4 44 39.6 10 9.0
Years 111 100.0 54 48.6 46 41.5 11 9.9
Year 9 111 100.0 49 44.7 50 45.0 12 10.8
Year 10 111 100.0 48 43.2 51 46.0 12 10.8
Note: 1. By way of IPO, trade sale or management buy-out/buy-in
Table 4
Cumulative Exit Status By Year Post-Buy-out and Type of Exit of 45 
Management Buy-outs Completed in the Period 1983-85 up to December 1995
Total sample No exit Exit^ Receivership
Age ofMBO No % No % No % No %
Year 1 45 100.0 45 100. 0 0.0 0 0
Year 2 45 100.0 45 100. 0 0.0 0 0
Year 3 45 100.0 44 97.8 1 2.2 0 0
Year 4 45 100.0 41 91.1 4 8.9 0 0
Year 5 45 100.0 39 86.7 6 13.3 0 0
Year 6 45 100.0 35 77.8 7 15.6 3 6.7
Year 7 45 100.0 34 75.6 7 15.6 4 8.9
Year 8 45 100.0 31 68.9 8 17.8 6 13.3
Year 9 45 100.0 30 66.7 9 20.0 6 13.3
Year 10 45 100.0 29 64.4 9 20.0 7 15.6
Note: 1. By way of IPO, trade sale or management buy-out/buy-in
Of the 35 non-exited buy-outs re-surveyed in 1996, 17 (48.6 per cent) had origi­
nally identified no specific method of exit. Ten years later, seven firms still had no 
specific exit method in mind, though a further nine were considering exit through 
retirement with a retained equity participation, seven expected to exit through fam­
ily succession and six through a secondary buy-out by other managers. It should be 
noted, however, that only 20 percent of this sample of 35 companies had bought 
back any ordinary stock but that almost all (96.2 percent) of those with preference 
stock in the initial financial structure had redeemed either all ( 1 1  firms) or some
(14 firms) of them, thus enabling non-bank financiers to achieve some form of 
exit.
Strategic Reorganization
As noted above, the results in this section are drawn from the authors’ follow- 
up survey of 35 buy-outs which had been surveyed 10 years previously. Three 
principal issues were examined, the factors influencing strategic direction, the 
direction of influence of extemal and internal factors on profitability and changes 
in insider and outsider directors.
Managers in these buy-outs were first asked to score the importance of a range 
of sources of growth identified at the time of the buy-out and also to score their 
actual importance in retrospect (Table 5). There was little change in the ranking of 
the factors between the time of the buy-out and the time of the second survey, 
though in general most elements received greater scores in retrospect. In contrast 
to the view sometimes expressed that buy-outs are principally about cost rational­
ization in mature markets, the three most important influences related to market 
factors, especially increases in the customer base, new markets and product devel­
opment. The importance of product development over this longer period is consis­
tent with findings in other studies (Wright, et al., 1992; Zahra, 1995) of product 
innovation in buy-outs in the short term. Introduction of new product technology 
did, however, receive a relatively low score, although in retrospect there were 
some indications that it had been more influential than originally anticipated.
Over one-half (51.4 per cent) of the sample had made at least one acquisition 
in the ten years or more since the buy-out. Strategic fit was generally considered to
Table 5
Managements’ Perceptions of Strategic Influence on Performance at 
Time of Buy-out and Over Ten Year Period Post Buy-out (Mean Score)
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Strategic Influence On Buy-out Ten Years On
Increased customer base 3.80 3.97
New Markets 3.79 3.97
Product Development 3.36 3.50
Rationalization of Operating Costs 3.31 3.31
Rationalization of Fixed Costs 3.12 3.26
New Capital Investment 2.83 2.82
Rationalization of Products 2.37 2.82
Introduction of New Product Technology 2.17 2.41
Acquisitions 1.85 2.21
Strategic Alliances 1.70 2.03
Note: Results based on scores for each item ranging from l=highly unimportant to 5=highly 
important.
Table 6
External Influences on Operating Profltability 
in the Long Term
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Influence Mean Score
Customer relations 4.06
Pricing 3.69
Competitors 3.55
Marketing 3.47
Product considerations 3.24
Product market 3.12
Economic climate 3.11
Interest rates 2.97
Location 2.97
Exchange rates 2.94
Financial markets 2.63
Note: Scores based on range l=highly negative effect on operating 
profitability through 5=highly positive.
be good (mean score of 4 on a range from 1 to 5 where 5=strongly agree with the 
statement) and there was some evidence of good knowledge of the target (mean 
score 3.38). However, in about two-fifths of cases there was evidence of problems 
with respect to the amount of management time consumed on the acquisition and 
its drain on cash.
The outcomes of strategic actions were examined by asking questions con­
cerning the external and internal influences on operating profitability. The strate­
gic importance attached to extending the customer base is reflected in the emphasis 
placed on customer relations as an external influence on profitability (Table 6). 
Other market factors such as pricing, competitors and marketing all received 
strong scores. General financial conditions were of lesser importance, with product 
related issues being scored somewhat more positively.
The most important internal influences on operating profitability over the long 
term related to control factors and human resource issues. Administrative cost con­
trol and accounting and other control systems were ranked first and third in impor­
tance (Table 7), while employee relations and management team relationships 
were ranked second and fourth, respectively. Although product development 
ranked highly as a strategic factor, as seen above, it ranked low as an internal influ­
ence on profitability, as did capital expenditure.
Over the long term it may be expected that extensive changes will occur in the 
board membership of bought out companies. In twenty three (almost two thirds) of 
the companies, there had been new appointments of executive directors to the 
board since the time of the first survey. There were multiple reasons for these 
appointments, but in twelve cases this was the result of the retirement of an incum­
bent, in eight cases it was in order to hire specialist skills and in only three cases
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Table 7
Internal Influences on Operating 
Profitability in the Long Term
Influence Mean Score
Employee Relations 3.86
Administt'ative Cost Control 3.80
Accounting and other control systems 3.74
Team relationships 3.68
Cash flow 3.50
Inventory control 3.44
Production efficiency 3.41
Facilities/equipment 3.29
Product development 3.18
Capital structure 3.06
Capital expenditure 3.06
Note: Scores based on range l=highly negative effect on operating profit­
ability through 5=highly positive.
Table 8
UK - Post Buy-out Performance Compared to Non Buy-outs; Comparison of 
Mean Performance Ratios and Statistically Significant Differences
t + 6 t + 5 t + 4 t + 3 t + 2 t+ 1
Return on Total Assets 0.039 0.033 00.051 0.051 0.044 0.005
0.058 0.064** 0.086* 0.087* 0.052 0.015
Return on Equity 0.165 0.069 -1.02 -0.37 0.008 0.76
0.120 0.305* 0.41* -0.09 0.982 0.30
Profit/Employee 1327 1229 2804 997 1016 348
2150* 2204* 4979 3127** 2704 81
Current Ratio 1.43 1.76 1.34 1.60 3.91 1.35
1.56 1.35 1.59* 2.44 1.41 1.07
Quick Ratio 0.93 1.25 0.92 1.07 3.34 o .n
1.08 0.87 1.01 1.78 0.97 0.73
Net Worth/Total Assets 0.299 0.298 0.345 0.39 0.39 0.338
0.339 0.325 0.391 0.36 0.27* 0.076
Notes: Significance levels = * 5% **1%.
First figure in each row is mean for non-buy-outs, second figure is mean for buy-outs.
was it because of poor performance of an incumbent. Within a period of up to three 
years after buy-out, the first survey showed that there had been changes in the buy­
out team in 19 per cent of cases (Wright, et al., 1992). In fourteen of the buy-outs 
there had been changes in the composition of the non-executive (outsider) director 
membership of the board, seven companies introducing a non-executive director 
for the first time.
Financial Performance Changes
The results in this section are based on the second sample of 251 buy-outs iden­
tified above, with data from 446 non-buy-outs being used for comparison purposes. 
Post buy-out performance was tracked for up to six years after the transaction. The 
results are shown in Table 8, where means of a range of performance variables for 
buy-outs and non-buy-outs are reported. Tests were carried out to identify those 
differences in the mean performance ratios for the buy-out and non-buy-out sub­
samples that could be deemed statistically significant. The test takes into account 
the variances associated with each mean value when evaluating the differences.
In the early years post buy-out, no significant differences in the return on total 
assets ratio are identified. This ratio is preferred as a measure of performance over 
the return on equity ratio as the latter may be distorted by the influence of negative 
reserves, especially in the short term. The return on total assets ratio is on average 
greater for buy-outs than non-buy-outs in the first two years, though not signifi­
cantly so. These findings are consistent with the notion that buy-outs frequently 
involve underperforming businesses, both in relation to their potential and in rela­
tion to their industries. Although, as seen earlier, actions are taken on buy-out 
which lead to improved performance, it may take some time before this signifi­
cantly exceeds the average for the sector. A similar pattern is observed in respect 
of labor productivity as measured by the profit to employee figures.
Over years 3 to 5 post buy-out, there are indications that buy-outs on average 
perform significantly better than comparable non-buy-outs on both the return on 
total assets and profit to employee measures. In our sample, this period relates to 
the late 1980s. In the sixth year after buy-out, the significantly greater performance 
of buy-outs begins to disappear.
Fewer significant differences are apparent in respect of the short term liquidity 
ratios and generally speaking both groups on average display acceptable levels of 
liquidity according to conventional levels. There are suggestions that buy-outs in 
their first two years have lower liquidity ratios than non-buy-outs, but that thereaf­
ter apart from year 5 they have superior ratios. This pattern may be consistent with 
the impact of tighter working capital control systems.
A similar pattern is observed in respect of net worth to total assets ratios as a 
measure of leverage. As expected, buy-outs initially have lower ratios than their 
non-buy-out matched counterparts, but over the longer period the relative posi­
tions are reversed.
Efficiency Changes
As in the previous section, the results below are based on the second sample of 
buy-outs identified earlier. The sample of non-buy-outs is used in order to analyze
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Table 9
Efficiency of Buy-outs and Non-Buy-outs: Cobb-Douglas Production
Function Estimates
Variables t+6 t+5 t+4 t+3 t+2 t+l
LogEmployment
(LL)
0.69*** 0.70*** 0.74*** 0.64*** 0.68*** 0.96***
LogCapital (LK) 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.21*** 0.29*** 0.13* 0.09
Buy-out (MBO) 0.002 0.21*** 0.11* 0.16** 0.07* 0.05
Industry dummies 
(IND)
yes yes yes yes yes yes
CONSTANT 7.56*** y 24*** 783*** 7 27*** 8.56*** 7.68***
r 2 0.81 0.85 0.86 0.96 0.94 0.92
F 133.1 154.4 140.9 18.1 17.1 lA
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.01 0.01 0.01
Note: Figures in brackets are t statistics
the effect of a buy-out per se on efficiency changes. The comparative productivity 
performance of buy-outs versus non-buy-outs was assessed in terms of the effi­
ciency in which they combine factor inputs (labor and capital) to produce outputs 
using the methodology described earlier. The results of the analysis are shown in 
Table 9. The analysis is carried out on surviving buy-outs and non-buy-outs over 
the relevant post-buy-out period. Thus six separate equations are estimated. A pos­
itive and significant sign on the variable MBO in the equation would indicate supe­
rior productive efficiency in the buy-out sub-sample, cet par, in that year. Our 
earlier deliberations, however, suggest that the productivity effects of buy-outs 
may not be immediate. For instance, a buy-out may not result in an inmiediate 
alignment of the goals of various groups of employees party to the buy-out or 
result in increased co-operation and better working practices from day one.
The basic production function appears well specified, with more or less con­
stant returns to scale (the coefficients on LL and LK, b + bl, approx. = 1), in all 
years with the exception of t+l and ?+2. Each of the equations is deemed statisti­
cally significant according to the and F-tests at 1% or better. The values 
indicate that the equations are explaining up to 96% of the total variations in output 
in the sample. The t+\, and to some extent ?+2, results are likely to be affected by 
noise in the accounting data post buy-out or by the effects of immediate re-organ­
isation of production and working practices. Thus, the coefficients for the first 
buy-out year are not significant suggesting that bought out companies undergo 
some initial period before the impact of the increased incentives and control mech­
anisms begin to be felt. This is consistent with the point made by Jones and Kato 
(1995) in respect of the timing of the initial benefits from ESOPs. A small but sig­
nificant productivity effect of the buy-out is observed in year t+2 which increases
to approximately a 20% productivity differential by year t+5. On average for the 
six years of comparison the buy-out sub-sample is exhibiting a 9% productivity 
differential over the non-buy-out control sample.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This study has examined the longer term effects of management buy-outs using 
two representative samples and a combination of financial and non-financial infor­
mation.
Evidence relating to the longevity of buy-outs suggests that even ten years 
after the transaction approaching half remain as buy-outs. However, it is clear that 
buy-outs receiving support from venmre capitalists exit at a considerably greater 
rate and sooner than non-venture backed deals. Reflecting expectations that ven­
ture capitalists are likely to invest in riskier ventures than providers of debt, ven­
ture backed exits are more likely to be both successful (i.e., stock market flotation) 
and unsuccessful (i.e., receivership). Indeed, returns on buy-out investments are 
the highest of any type of venture capital investment in the UK (BVCA, 1996).
Buy-outs which remain as such for periods of at least ten years were found to 
experience extensive changes in their senior management team. They are also 
found to engage in significant product development and market-based strategic 
actions, but the greatest positive impact on operating profitability is considered to 
derive from enhanced control of costs, enhanced control systems and from human 
resource management factors.
In support of earlier studies, there is evidence that buy-outs display raw short 
term improvements in financial performance. There are also indications that buy­
outs on average significantly outperform their industrial sectors for around five 
years after the transaction. This period is longer than previously suggested by other 
studies. Analysis of changes in efficiency also provides evidence that buy-outs are 
significantly more successful than non-buy-outs over a similar period post-buy­
out.
The above findings suggest a number of implications for practitioners. Suc­
cessful buy-outs may require both innovations as well as restructuring of cost 
bases and control systems. Even apparently stable product sectors, the classic buy­
out situation, may eventually have limited life-cycles and require new product 
development if the buy-out is to succeed in the longer term.
The evidence of the existence of superior longer term performance by buy­
outs suggests that venture capitalists may need to consider their investment per­
spectives carefully, particularly in respect of exit versus second-round investment. 
For financiers it is clear that the buy-out concept can be successfully applied to 
growth as well as restructuring cases. This point raises the importance of appropri­
ate financial structuring and entrepreneurial screening and matching to the circum-
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stances of a particular transaction. Nevertheless, there are indications of a need to 
take a life-cycle perspective of buy-outs in order to meet the demands of entrepre­
neurs’ career aspirations, market contingencies and investor requirements for real­
ization of returns.
Further research may usefully be directed at a number of areas. First, the anal­
ysis has focused solely on management buy-outs, that is those transactions which 
involve incumbent managers. As is becoming recognized, the generic buy-out con­
cept involves a variety of forms. The management buy-in, involving external man­
agers raises adverse selection issues which may have important implications for 
entrepreneurs’ ability to effect efficiency improvements. This also has implica­
tions for their longevity, with there already being evidence that they are subject to 
significantly higher failure rates (Robbie & Wright, 1996). There would appear to 
be scope for comparative studies of the longer term impact of management buy-ins 
and buy-outs.
In analyzing longer-term profitability and efficiency, there would appear to be 
scope for examination of differences in these aspects of firm behavior in respect to 
larger and small buy-outs, the influences of managerial equity stakes and other ele­
ments of corporate governance and the impact of the original source of the trans­
action. There is also scope for further exploration of the changes in efficiency post 
buy-out.
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